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◊ The year 2018 saw the emergence of a broad social 
movement demanding stringent policies for climate 
change mitigation in Europe and other world regions. 
Widespread meteorological extreme events consistent 
with rapid global warming are stoking this movement. 
Especially in Europe, it has already changed the political 
landscape in a number of countries as green parties have 
scored record votes. Therefore, policymakers in many 
countries are sharpening their emission reduction targets 
for 2030 and 2050.
◊ At the same time, strong interest in an integrated 
hydrogen economy is emerging, where hydrogen would 
become a key fuel for transportation, industrial uses 
and even electricity generation. Countries as diverse as 
Australia, China, European Union (EU) member states 
and Japan are embarking on far-reaching strategies for 
a hydrogen economy, starting with the support of fuel- 
cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) but reaching beyond the 
transport sector.  
◊ Hydrogen production technologies are manifold: 
feedstocks include fossil fuels and renewable electricity. 
At present, the costs of ‘green’ hydrogen, which is 
produced with renewable electricity, are still about five 
times higher than those of gas or coal-based hydrogen. 
An expansion of green hydrogen production, however, is 
likely to close the gap within less than a decade. Especially 
promising are emerging technologies that allow to use 
hydrogen as a fuel in existing thermal power plants 
without major refurbishment.
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◊ The Gulf region faces a significant risk of oil exports 
becoming squeezed by a successful hydrogen revolution 
in the next decades. At the same time, Gulf countries 
are blessed with abundant solar energy resources that 
can easily be used for green and low-cost hydrogen 
production at large scale. Therefore, it is recommended 
that they proactively participate in this revolution, also 
given the region’s long experience with pipeline and ship 
transport of other flammable materials. Early movers are 
likely to benefit from scale effects and become leaders 
in the market, especially if there are lock-in effects 
for hydrogen supply chains – i.e. hydrogen importing 
countries wanting to continue to procure from suppliers 
with which they have long-term experience. 
◊ The UAE is already a leader in the Middle East with the 
first solar hydrogen electrolysis plant under construction 
in Dubai and a fledgling FCEV fleet. Given its success in 
bringing down the cost of solar, the UAE would be in an 
excellent position to achieve the lowest global cost of 
green hydrogen production. With both the World Expo 
hosted by Dubai and the G20 presided by Saudi Arabia in 
2020, the UAE could leverage either of these platforms 
to establish, and host, a high-profile International 
Hydrogen Economy Initiative (IHEI). This initiative 
could serve as a policy coordination tool between 
hydrogen importers and exporters, initially focusing on 
accelerating interactions between the Gulf region – a 
potential supplier – and Japan and the EU who both are 
likely to become key hydrogen importers in the next 
decade based on their self-defined energy policy targets.
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The Issue
For many years, the international negotiations on the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
have been aiming to limit global temperature increase 
to a level that is not dangerous for humanity. Over the 
last 20 years, governments of many key countries have 
introduced numerous policies to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. Nevertheless, global GHG emissions 
are still growing due to the consumption and production 
of goods and services increasing more quickly than the 
GHG emissions intensity of the production process is 
decreasing. 
In the past, policy makers have shied away from 
implementing effective climate policy instruments with 
stringent targets. The reasons for this are manifold and 
range from pushback from industrial lobbies through 
concerns related to costs, jobs and international 
competitiveness, to fears of taking unpopular decisions 
and disgruntling potential voters.  
On the international level, an agreement on manda-
tory, ambitious GHG reduction targets has so far 
been prevented due to the requirement to achieve 
consensus in the UNFCCC decision-making process and, 
consequently, the inability to achieve consensus about 
distributing the required reductions among countries. 
The Kyoto Protocol, which would have allowed such an 
approach, was replaced by the Paris Agreement which 
is a pure ’bottom-up’ system with non-mandatory, 
self-determined national GHG reduction pledges 
(‘NDCs’), which for most countries still lack the required 
level of ambition to avoid dangerous climate change. 
Moreover, in various key countries populists have come 
to power on an openly ‘climate sceptic’ platform since 
2016, exemplified by US president Trump and Brazilian 
president Bolsonaro.
Recently, however, the political landscape has started 
to change drastically in key regions. The acceleration 
of global temperature increase from 2014 onwards and 
extreme weather events, such as the unprecedented 
European drought in 2018, historical temperature 
records in North-Western Europe shattered by over 
2°C in June and July 2019, and repeated heat waves in 
Australia, India, Japan and the Middle East, combined 
with what has become a global grassroot movement, 
Fridays for Future, do not only create public awareness 
but also strong political pressure.
As a consequence, key economic regions such as the 
EU are now preparing for real and ambitious emission 
reductions. In late 2018, the European Commission 
announced the target to become CO2 neutral by 2050.1 
The Commission’s legal proposal is now being processed 
by the European Parliament and Council which normally 
takes one to two years before formal adoption.
In the meantime, over the past decade numerous 
scientists, inventors and practitioners have put 
enormous efforts into developing technical solutions 
for GHG reduction. The success of technologies in the 
field of renewable energies such as wind and solar 
power is uncontested, and in many areas they are now 
the cheapest electricity generation options.2 However, 
renewables still suffer from the challenge of providing 
baseload power due to their intermittency and the still 
high costs of electricity storage.
Less noticed to date, but intensively discussed in expert 
circles, is the progress in the development of innovative 
hydrogen technologies. They have the potential for far-
reaching interventions within the next couple of years. 
If only some of this potential materialises, the vision 
of hydrogen economies – where hydrogen replaces 
coal, oil and natural gas and becomes the dominant 
fuel, particularly for heating and vehicles – can become 
reality within one to two decades. Hydrogen solutions 
could also be linked with intermittent renewable energy 
technologies to further optimise outputs and cost-
effectiveness.
The emergence of hydrogen economies might lead to a 
significant reduction in global demand for conventional 
fuels such as coal, natural gas and oil. While this is a 
significant risk for any oil-exporting country, there might 
also be strategic chances for Gulf countries to benefit 
economically from this future demand. In order to be 
well-prepared and in a position to take early action, a 
systematic and comprehensive analysis is required. 
This EDA Insight provides an overview of the current 
global climate and energy policies, the state of hydrogen 
technologies and demand today and until 2030. From 
this, it derives recommendations for how Gulf countries 
could position themselves in the emerging hydrogen 
markets, also with a view to economic diversification.
2020s: Tipping Point of Global Energy 
and Climate Policies? 
Underpinned by a probable further expansion of the 
public movement to aggressively engage in GHG 
mitigation policy, Europe is likely to again become 
a global leader in climate policy. In July 2019, the 
designated new European Commission President Ursula 
von der Leyen, announced that she will increase the 
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ambition of the current GHG emission reduction targets 
with a view to achieve a 50% reduction (compared to 
1990) by 2030, and GHG-neutrality by 2050. 
In light of the insufficient level of ambition in existing 
NDC targets and increasing public pressure to act on 
climate change, UN Secretary-General António Guterres 
convened a UN Climate Summit in September 2019, with 
the objective to agree on concrete plans to enhance the 
NDCs by 2020, ‘in line with reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by 45 per cent over the next decade, and to 
net zero emissions by 2050’.3
A potential Democratic successor to president Trump in 
the US and a reinforcement of East Asian and Oceanic 
climate policy engagement together could lead to a 
‘tipping point’ in the early 2020s towards ambitious 
climate policies both on the national and international 
level.
With regards to the hydrogen economy, a joint leadership 
between Europe, Japan and Australia could emerge. In 
a global comparison, Europe  has been providing the 
highest governmental R&D budgets for hydrogen and 
fuel cells since 2011 – between US$250–400 million 
annually.4 Japan has the objective to become the first 
hydrogen economy in the world and aims to reduce 
its strong dependency on imported fossil fuels, which 
currently cover 93% of the country’s energy use.5 
‘Green’ hydrogen, derived from renewable energies, as 
well as ‘brown’ hydrogen, made CO2-free through carbon 
capture and storage (CCS), have been identified as 
technological solutions both for national energy security 
and the climate change challenge. Japan currently 
provides approximately US$150 million in governmental 
R&D support for hydrogen per year.6
In Australia, an intense political discussion about a 
shift from being a fossil fuel to a hydrogen exporter has 
erupted in recent years. The country, being the world’s 
largest net coal exporter (with approximately 32% 
of global coal exports,7 is well-aware that coal has no 
long-term perspective and is heavily investing in the 
development of hydrogen production. 
Over the last years, the Morrison government has 
invested about AU$100 million (US$70 million) 
to develop Australia’s hydrogen industry. In June 
2018, Japan and Australia signed a memorandum of 
understanding designed to address ‘contemporary 
energy challenges’, including hydrogen. A ‘cooperation 
in establishing a future hydrogen supply-chain and 
industry’ has high priority for the two countries.8 
Since 2016, China too has ramped up research spending 
on hydrogen technologies to a level of about US$100 
million per year, apparently due to a very strong interest 
in finding clean alternatives to coal and diesel, which 
are the main sources of high local air pollution levels in 
key cities. In 2000–2010, the US invested over US$400 
million per year in hydrogen R&D, but has drastically 
lowered its engagement, to US$100 million annually 
today.9
To conclude, Australia, China, the EU and Japan are 
currently the most active countries working towards 
hydrogen economies, with Australia having a focus on 
the hydrogen production side and the EU and Japan on 
the consumption side. China’s role is still unclear – it has 
potential to generate large demand, but could also build 
strong domestic supply chains. 
With increasing pressure to effectively fight climate 
change, governments in these countries/regions can 
be expected to intensify public efforts to allow a quick 
development of green hydrogen economies.
Overview of the State of Hydrogen 
Technologies and Demand Today and 
Until 2030
From 2000–2018, global hydrogen (H2) demand 
has increased by 65%, from 70 Mt H2 to 115 Mt H2.10 
Traditionally, most hydrogen has been used in the 
chemical industry, for fertilizer production, metal 
treatment and food production. 
Interest in using hydrogen as fuel for private and 
commercial vehicles developed in the late 1970s due to 
the oil price shocks and scenarios of quickly decreasing 
oil reserves. Bringing fuel-cell driven cars to technical 
and commercial readiness took quite some time, also 
due to the fact that – as we know today – oil reserves 
were not as limited as thought in the early 1980s 
and price levels remained at moderate levels (thus 
decreasing pressure for technological innovation). 
But since the early 2000s, the first fuel-cell driven 
cars and SUVs are on the road (see Box 1), and the 
global industry initiative Hydrogen Council (see Box 2) 
estimates that by 2030, close to 10% of cars sold in key 
industrialised countries could be hydrogen-driven fuel-
cell electric vehicles (FCEVs).11  
In 2018, the South Korean car producer Hyundai 
announced a production capacity target of 0.5 million 
FCEVs for 2030 with an investment volume of US$6.7 
billion.12 The German-based technology provider 
Bosch expects that in 2030 20% of all electric vehicles 
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worldwide will be FCEVs.13 It recently engaged in a 
strategic partnership with Powercell Sweden, aiming 
to start commercial serial production of hydrogen fuel 
cells for heavy-duty commercial vehicles. Other world 
leading car-manufacturers such as Daimler, Toyota, 
Honda and Renault have built FCEVs that are ready for the 
market. Ford, TATA Motors and Indian Oil Corporation 
have built prototypes and are undergoing road trials. 
To conclude: despite a slow onset, FCEVs are now about 
to reach a critical momentum, and so is the required 
infrastructure, which includes hydrogen fuel stations.
Fuel-cell driven cars are only one market segment within 
the transport sector. The first hydrogen-powered trains 
built by Alstom started operating in the public regular 
service in Germany in 2018, and several communities 
have ordered dozens of additional ones. Hydrogen-
driven buses are operated in several cities worldwide – 
currently with a low but increasing scope.
However, perhaps the most important aspect is that 
increasing demand for hydrogen is not limited to the 
transport sector. Industry as well as large technology 
providers such as Siemens or General Electric have started 
preparing their power and industrial plant technologies, 
such as burners and torches, for being capable of utilising 
H2-blended fuels. Examples range from hydrogen boiler 
designs (e.g. from Mitsubishi-Hitachi Power Systems), 
to hydrogen-to-steam generators where water gets 
injected into the combusted hydrogen/oxygen stream 
and to non-catalytic, flameless oxidation technologies. 
All these initiatives could accelerate global hydrogen 
demand tremendously. 
Last but not least, technologies are emerging that would 
allow efficient utilisation of hydrogen in conventional 
thermal power plants by the mid-2020s without the 
need for major refurbishments, thus directly replacing 
fossil fuels such as coal, natural gas or oil. This has the 
potential for a quick revolution of the global electricity 
generation system. In 2018, about 40% of global 
Box 1: Electric Vehicles (EVs) Versus Fuel Cell 
Electric Vehicles (FCEVs)
Electric vehicles (EVs) are driven by electricity that is 
stored in an on-site battery. Charging can take place 
at home or a public EV-charging stations. While the 
technology has progressed significantly in the last 
decade, its key challenges remain, including limited 
range, weight of the batteries and long recharging 
times (1 to 14 hours, depending on the capacity 
of the charger). Additional problems associated 
with EVs are the environmental impacts of battery 
production. 
Contrary to this, fuel-cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) 
are powered by hydrogen that is converted in a fuel-
cell into electric energy. FCEVs therefore do not need 
as large a battery as EVs. Hydrogen is stored in a tank 
similar to that for gasoline/diesel in conventional 
cars, and the re-fuelling process is quick. The range 
of FCEVs is comparable to that of a conventional 
car. Today’s challenges include that hydrogen cars 
are still very expensive due to the lack of mass 
production and that the underlying infrastructure, 
such hydrogen fuel stations, has yet to be built.
4
Box 2: Industry Initiative - The Hydrogen Council
The Hydrogen Council, launched in early 2017 at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, is a global CEO-led 
advisory body providing long-term vision on the role 
of hydrogen technologies towards a global energy 
transition – in mobility as well as in the power, 
industrial and residential sectors. 
As of mid-2019, the Hydrogen Council is composed 
of over 60 CEOs and chairpersons from large, global 
companies such as 3M, Airbus, Air Liquide, Air 
Products, Alstom, Anglo American, Audi AG, BMW 
GROUP, BP, China Energy, Cummins, Daimler, EDF, 
ENGIE, Equinor, Faurecia, General Motors, Great Wall 
Motor, Honda, Hyundai Motor, Iwatani, Johnson 
Matthey, JXTG Nippon Oil & Energy Corporation, 
Kawasaki, KOGAS, Linde, Plastic Omnium, 
Royal Dutch Shell, Sinopec, The Bosch Group, 
Thyssenkrupp, Total, Toyota and Weichai. 
The Council invites governments and key society 
stakeholders to join the companies in discussing the 
contribution of hydrogen to the energy transition and 
to collaborate to create an effective implementation 
plan. 
The main outputs so far have been the coordination 
and funding of studies to support further 
development of the hydrogen industry. The Council 
for example contributed the ‘Future of Hydrogen’ 
report with the International Energy Agency and 
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI), published at at the G20 Summit in Osaka in 
June 2019.
For more information, see: Hydrogen Council, 2017, Hydrogen 
Scaling Up: A Sustainable Pathway for the Global Energy Transition.
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electricity generation was fuelled by coal and oil,14 
equalling to a total installed capacity of 2,500 GW. 
Assuming that by 2030, 10% of the installed capacity – 
or 250 GW, equivalent to 250 large-scale lignite power 
plants – would be converted to hydrogen fuel, the 
additional hydrogen demand would be 120-170 million 
tonnes of pure hydrogen annually. Comparing this to 
today’s hydrogen consumption of 70 million tonnes/
year demonstrates the tremendous potential of the 
future hydrogen market.
As will be discussed in more detail below, given the 
renewable energy potential of the Gulf region, this brings 
outstanding opportunities to Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries to not only diversify economically but 
also tap into new energy export market segments, as 
hydrogen has the potential to replace coal, and thus has 
a much broader demand spectrum compared to oil.
There are many different technological options to 
produce hydrogen, based on fossil fuels or electricity. 
They include steam methane reformation of natural 
gas (SMR), coal gasification and different forms of 
electrolysis such as proton-exchange membrane (PEM) 
technologies. The former two types of technologies lead 
to GHG emissions, the latter are emissions-free if the 
electricity comes from renewable sources. 
Until today, the key challenge for scaling up hydrogen to 
a level that it can fuel whole economies is the high level 
of hydrogen production costs. SMR based on natural gas 
without carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) 
currently has the lowest cost and is therefore the most 
widespread option for hydrogen production. Costs 
range from US$0.9/kg H2 (Middle East) to US$1.8/kg H2 
(Europe) and increase by approximately US$ 0.5/kg H2 
if carbon capture and storage (CCS) is added.15 Today’s 
costs for producing hydrogen from renewable electricity 
using PEM electrolysis reach US$4.2–5.2/kg. 
The cost gap between fossil and ‘green’ hydrogen thus 
currently reaches a factor of five. However, it is likely to 
fall rapidly. Forecasts for 2025 expect a 60% decrease 
in green hydrogen production costs, to US$1.6–1.9/
kg.16 This is mainly due to improvements in the scale 
of operation and improved capacity factors. At that 
level, fossil and green hydrogen will be in the same 
cost range, and national carbon pricing policies would 
then shift the balance in favour of the ‘green’ hydrogen 
producers. This is because carbon pricing schemes make 
fuels that result in carbon emissions more expensive. 
Hence, if hydrogen production results in CO2 emissions, 
these emissions would be accounted for in the emission 
balances of companies subject to the carbon pricing 
scheme. As a result, these companies would rather buy 
green hydrogen than ’black’ hydrogen (i.e. produced 
from fossil fuels without CCS) or brown hydrogen (i.e. 
produced from fossil fuels, but with CCS). 
It is important to keep in mind that even brown hydrogen 
production results in CO2 emissions of 1–2 kg CO2/
kg H2 under CCS17, compared to 0 t CO2/kg H2 for green 
hydrogen.
A largely scaled-up demand for hydrogen could lead to 
even more rapid cost decreases due to scale effects. The 
next section looks at emerging policies that could drive 
such an accelerated scenario.
International Governance Frame- 
works and Policies Impacting 
Hydrogen Demand and 
Technology Development
Globally, the first initiatives for governance of large-
scale hydrogen infrastructures are emerging on 
the fringes of larger policy processes. The Group of 
Twenty (G20) has started to address the issue under 
the Japanese presidency in 2018/2019. It was set as 
a priority following a Hydrogen Energy Ministerial 
meeting held in Tokyo in October 2018, which brought 
together representatives of 21 countries. At a special 
meeting in June 2019, the ‘G20 Karuizawa Energy 
Innovation Action Plan’ was agreed which stresses the 
role of hydrogen.18
Under the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM, set up by the 
US in 2009), a dedicated Hydrogen Initiative launched 
in 2019 has brought together Canada, the EU, India, 
Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Saudi Arabia and the US. Its initial focus will be on 
promoting successful deployment of hydrogen within 
current industrial applications, enabling deployment 
of hydrogen technologies in transport and exploring 
the role of hydrogen in meeting the energy needs of 
communities. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
serves as coordinator. 
The initiative with the longest history is the International 
Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy 
(IPHE), established in 2003, with the aim to accelerate 
the transition to clean and efficient energy and 
mobility systems using fuel cells and hydrogen (FCH) 
technologies. It has 20 members including the largest 
emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa), Australia, Japan and various smaller 
countries, mostly from Europe. The Gulf Region so far is 
not represented.
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As the IEA points out in its landmark study ‘The Future 
of Hydrogen’ commissioned by the Japanese G20 
presidency, the number of countries with polices that 
directly support investment in hydrogen technologies 
is increasing, as is the number of targeted sectors.19 
By mid-2019, about 50 hydrogen supporting policies 
and incentives were active globally. The most active 
countries were Australia, China, the EU and its member 
states, India, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, South Africa 
and the US (in particular California) (see Box 3). 
Besides policies and measures that target hydrogen 
directly, national climate and energy policies can have 
a huge indirect impact on the economic attractiveness 
of hydrogen. For example, carbon pricing through 
GHG emissions trading schemes, CO2 taxes/fees or 
taxes on fossil fuels can play a key role in closing the 
cost gap between green and fossil hydrogen as well as 
conventional fossil fuels.  
Strong carbon pricing might make the European Union 
the most attractive hydrogen market for the years to 
come. The EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) covers 
emissions from more than 11,000 heavy energy-using 
installations (power stations and industrial plants) 
and thus around 45% of the EU’s GHG emissions. The 
latest reforms of the EU ETS are showing their effect: 
since mid-2017, prices for the so-called EU-allowances 
(equalling the permit to emit 1 t CO2-eq) have more than 
quadrupled and reached record levels of €30/t CO2 in 
July 2019.
CO2-prices at this level can become an effective and 
quick game-changer, as they increase the economic 
attractiveness of CO2-free hydrogen compared to fossil 
fuels. Take the example of coal-fired power plants: older 
plants typically emit about 1 t CO2/MWh. If an innovative 
hydrogen technology allows the refurbishment of 
that plant and a fuel-switch to green hydrogen, then 
a 500 MW power plant can free about 3.5 million EU-
allowances per year – equalling about US$110 million/
year, or US$1 billion during a nine-year compliance 
period.
Those numbers show that hydrogen may quickly become 
economically viable – and potentially even highly 
attractive – in countries with strong climate policies. 
It is important to note that it is likely that countries 
Box 3: Examples of Political Hydrogen Initiatives / Programmes in Selected Key Countries
• In the European Union, a €170 million project for hydrogen-fueled cars is currently in its second phase – to 
demonstrate the practicability of FCEVs and to expand the hydrogen fuel station grid in the EU.
• China, with its burgeoning population of motor vehicles, aims to shift vehicles away from fossil fuels quickly in 
order to reduce local air pollution, which has emerged as one of the key political challenges for the government. 
After a successful electrification of short distance vehicles, with 250 million two-wheelers and 0.4 million city 
buses currently on Chinese roads, Wan Gang, Minister of Science and Technology, is now aiming to roll out 
FCEV buses and trucks for long-distance transport. Various Chinese cities are putting additional FCEV buses 
on the roads, with Shanghai aiming at 3,000 by 2020. In 2018 alone, China invested US$12.4 billion into 
supporting hydrogen fuel cells for vehicles. 
• Japan recently reiterated its target to become the world’s leading hydrogen economy and has developed a 
comprehensive hydrogen strategy aiming to achieve cost parity of hydrogen with fuel gas and liquified natural 
gas (LNG). For reaching this target, Japan has already invested US$1.5 billion in R&D over the last years. For 
the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, US$380 million will be spent on 35 hydrogen fuel stations and 6,000 FCEVs; the 
national target for FCEV rollout for 2030 is 0.8 million. 
• In February 2019, the construction of the first Middle Eastern solar water electrolysis facility started in Dubai, 
operated by Dubai Electricity and Water Authority and with a 250-tonnes annual capacity. It uses technology 
of the German company Siemens. The Expo 2020 Dubai will operate FCEVs with the hydrogen generated by 
the facility. The first hydrogen filling station in the Middle East was opened in Dubai in October 2017. A total 
of 55 Toyota Mirai FCEVs are running on the UAE’s roads, and Air Liquide et al. estimate that 12 hydrogen 
fueling stations would be sufficient to cover the nation’s hydrogen fuel demand, Also, Abu Dhabi Police has 
announced plans to convert of its vehicle fleet to FCEVs by the 2050s.
Sources used: Air Liquid, Khalifa University, Al Futtaim Motors, 2018, Hydrogen Mobility: Hydrogen Mobility in the UAE, authored by Maram 
Awad, October 2018.
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such as the EU will define hydrogen eligibility criteria, 
which would mean allowing only green hydrogen from 
renewable energies and rejecting hydrogen produced 
from fossil fuels (even if it has a CCS-component).
Once a certain level of hydrogen demand is established, 
significant production cost reductions can be expected. 
The history of renewable electricity generation costs 
is an instructive example of such an effect. Globally, 
levelised costs of electricity generation have fallen 
by 77% for solar photovoltaics (PV), by 45% for 
concentrated solar power (CSP) and by 34% for onshore 
wind between 2010 and 2018.20 This analogy shows 
that the sizeable cost reductions for green hydrogen 
production can be achieved with sufficient demand in 
a few years. It therefore appears that hydrogen is very 
close to a tipping point.
Gulf Country Interests in Today’s 
and Future Hydrogen Markets 
– Analysis of Chances and Risks 
for Oil Exporting Countries
So far, many – but not all – policymakers in the GCC 
countries have hoped that the sustained global increase 
in energy demand would override any attempts to 
decarbonise economies and thus allow to continue 
to sustain GCC economies mainly on oil and natural 
gas exports. A successful hydrogen revolution would 
jeopardise this basic tenet, as it would lead to a 
replacement of oil and natural gas in all sectors of 
the economy – transport, industry and electricity 
generation. 
In order to prevent such a scenario, GCC policymakers 
will have to decide how and when to engage proactively 
in the hydrogen economy. The worst case would be 
that policy makers in the region take a decision too late 
and by then the region has already been left behind 
by other world regions that have built a full hydrogen 
infrastructure.
GCC policymakers may think that their contribution to 
a hydrogen economy could be based on cheap fossil 
feedstocks. This may be true in the short term, but not 
in the long term. From a climate policy point of view, 
only CO2-free hydrogen is interesting. Contrary to this, 
hydrogen production based on coal, natural gas or fossil-
fuel-based electricity will lead to GHG emissions (unless 
combined with CCS) and is therefore unfavourable. 
Hence, the world will demand CO2-free hydrogen that 
can either be produced from renewable-energy based 
electrolysis or from for example natural-gas based SMR 
combined with CCS. 
It must be noted that CCS is often seen as environ-
mentally problematic due to the risk of future leakages 
or seepages and the decrease in energy efficiency due 
to energy consumption for capture.  Consequently, 
one can assume that demand for green hydrogen from 
renewable energies will be higher and a price premium 
may emerge. Another scenario is that key importers 
such as the EU will define restrictions that only allow 
renewable-energy derived hydrogen to be used without 
carbon penalties.  It is important to keep in mind that the 
EU has always opposed CCS projects under the UNFCCC. 
For these reasons, one can expect a significantly 
higher and more stable demand for green hydrogen 
than for brown or even black hydrogen.
Many countries and regions that will have a high 
hydrogen demand – such as the EU and Japan – do 
not have sufficiently attractive resources for solar and 
wind installations required to produce the hydrogen to 
cover their demand. This gives a competitive advantage 
to countries with abundant resources such as the Gulf 
region which is situated in the world’s sun belt. In the 
context of a hydrogen economy, this endowment can 
become a crucial basis for a high competitiveness as 
producers of hydrogen for export. If GCC countries were 
to adopt this role, it would even allow them to retain the 
basic business model of the oil era which is based on 
cheap production of a universally used fuel for transport 
and heat generation. 
In contrast to the oil business, in a hydrogen economy, 
Gulf countries will compete with a broader set of 
countries that can be roughly equated with the 
members of the International Solar Alliancei  and some 
places with abundant wind energy such as Argentina, 
Chile or Peru. But many of these countries, especially in 
Africa, are lacking the investment capital and business 
environment to rapidly engage in hydrogen production 
and export. 
If initial investments in renewable energy are made at 
a level sufficient to generate economies of scale, and 
coupled with an appropriate transport infrastructure, 
the first mover will generate a lock-in in terms of 
customer retention, especially if the country manages 
to agree on long-term delivery contracts. This has been 
seen with natural gas delivery in the past. Ideally, the 
GCC would develop a joint strategy to maximise cost 
reduction. This strategy could – based on the past 
i  For more information see: http://isolaralliance.org/
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successful efforts of the UAE – be aimed at achieving 
the lowest solar electricity generation costs in the world 
– achieved by the PV and CSP components of Dubai’s 
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park.
With regard to transport infrastructure, the region’s 
decades of experience with pipeline and shipping 
infrastructure can also be harnessed to implement a 
hydrogen pipeline and port network able to deliver 
hydrogen to the whole world. 
An International Policy Framework 
to Facilitate Gulf Countries’ 
Participation in Emerging Global  
Hydrogen Markets
The early 2020s are likely to see the emergence of 
a global hydrogen economy, driven by heavyweight 
frontrunners such as Japan, the EU, China and Australia. 
While the two latter countries have sufficient domestic 
renewable electricity potential to generate their own 
hydrogen supply (China alone had a curtailment of 100 
TWh renewable electricity in 2018 which could have 
been put to good use in hydrogen production), Japan 
and the EU do not have a significant domestic hydrogen 
generation potential. 
Therefore, both Japan and the EU will need to identify 
regions that could produce, process and transport 
hydrogen in the required quantities and become 
preferred trade partners. The GCC countries have 
historically close oil trading relationships with these 
regions which can be built on. GCC countries can also 
become technology partners for key players from 
Europe and Japan, as exemplified by the Siemens–
DEWA collaboration on the pilot solar hydrogen plant in 
Dubai (see Box 3). While the UAE has so far been more 
of an observer in terms of international governance and 
events focused on hydrogen, the upcoming World Expo 
2020 provides an excellent opportunity to become seen 
as a proactive player in the field. 
A high-profile International Hydrogen Economy 
Initiative (IHEI), launched for example in the context 
of Saudi Arabia’s G20 presidency in 2020 – going 
beyond the current international initiatives in scope and 
resources – could even further enhance the profile of 
the region. In order to be successful, such an initiative 
would need a permanent administrative infrastructure 
which could be offered by either the UAE or Saudi Arabia. 
Here, the successful experience of the UAE in hosting 
the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 
could be harnessed. Within a decade, IRENA has become 
a premier hub for renewable energy-related data and 
an opinion leader, convener of high-level debates 
and facilitator of project investments in developing 
countries. It is therefore recommended for the UAE to 
rapidly undertake: 
• A detailed strategic assessment of the economic 
potential for green and brown hydrogen with the 
time horizons 2030 and 2050, including a technical 
and economic cost-benefit analysis looking at 
different options for hydrogen production, storage 
and transportation;
• A detailed and comprehensive analysis of hydrogen, 
energy and climate policies in key countries and 
regions that will likely become hydrogen importers 
with the time horizons 2025, 2030 and 2050;
• Proactive participation in international discussions 
under G20, CEM and IPHE on hydrogen standards, 
including transportation, safety and environment; 
and
• A pilot initiative for green hydrogen export and use 
under the market mechanisms of Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement on climate change. This could be 
conducted jointly with the EU, given that the new 
European Commission is likely to engage more 
proactively in market mechanisms, with Switzerland 
where hydrogen is gaining significant domestic 
policy traction, or with Japan which has proactively 
been using its Joint Crediting Mechanism (a bilateral 
carbon offset mechanism) as an Article 6 pilot. Such 
a green hydrogen pilot could be built on the DEWA 
solar electrolysis plant and signed at the World Expo 
2020.
If the IHEI idea gains traction, it could serve as a 
policy coordination tool between hydrogen importers 
and exporters. In order to generate mutual benefits, 
exporters could commit to hydrogen export price 
reductions indexed on export volume increases, while 
importers would sign long-term contracts ensuring 
viability of the investments. Moreover, the definition 
of international standards for hydrogen transportation 
and safety as well as joint investments in international 
transport infrastructures could be orchestrated through 
the IHEI.
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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
CCUS – carbon capture utilization and storage
CEM – Clean Energy Ministerial
CO2 – carbon dioxide
CSP – concentrated solar power
FCEV – fuel-cell electric vehicle
FCH – fuel cells and hydrogen
GHG – greenhouse gas
H2 – molecular hydrogen
IEA – International Energy Agency
IPHE – International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy
IRENA – International Renewable Energy Agency
LNG – liquefied natural gas
PV - photovoltaic
NDC – nationally determined contribution (Paris Agreement)
SMR – steam methane reformation of natural gas
PEM – proton-exchange membrane
UNFCCC – UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
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